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Abstract 
The second labour of Heracles, the epic struggle with the Hydra, is 
used as a metaphor for the difficulties that may be encountered in 
analysing and measuring social capital. In Greek mythology, the 
Hydra ‘had a prodigious dog-like body, and eight or nine snaky heads, 
one of them immortal. In a sense, social capital is the intellectual 
equivalent of the Hydra in that it is conceptualised in many different 
ways. The unquestioning adoption and application of social capital 
rhetoric is potentially harmful, especially if it distracts policy makers 
from the real causes of Indigenous poverty and ongoing social 
exclusion. This article outlines the conceptual and empirical issues that 
are likely to plague attempts to measure social capital. After discussing 
some possible roles for social capital in describing Indigenous poverty, 
the article advocates a modest conceptualisation of social capital that 
focuses on the structure of social networks.  
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Introduction 
Classical references may have gone out of style in scholarly work, but they can enhance 
the imagination of the reader by examining issues indirectly or by analogy. This article 
uses the second labour of Heracles, the epic struggle with the Hydra, as a metaphor for 
the difficulties that may be encountered in analysing and measuring social capital.  
In Greek mythology, the Hydra ‘had a prodigious dog-like body, and eight or nine snaky 
heads, one of them immortal; but some credit it with fifty, or one hundred, or even ten 
thousand heads. It was so venomous that its very breath, or the smell of its tracks, could 
destroy life’ (Graves 1955: 107–110).i In a sense, the number of heads was immaterial 
because killing a non-immortal head would only result in two or three growing in its 
place. Note that the Hydra was not all bad, or at least without utility, as part of its 
immortal head was filled with gold! 
Social capital is the intellectual equivalent of the Hydra in that it is conceptualised in 
many different ways. While many of the heads of social capital appear relatively 
harmless compared to the Hydra, the unquestioning adoption and application of social 
capital rhetoric is potentially harmful, especially if it distracts policy makers from the 
real causes of Indigenous poverty and ongoing social exclusion. This article reflects on 
the efficacy of the construct of social capital as a basis for social policy to reduce 
Indigenous poverty.  
The ‘many-headed’ nature of social capital is evident in the many streams that come 
under the auspices of the broad concept. In the communitarian tradition it is seen as a 
public good that is under-invested because it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. For 
Coleman (1988), it is close to a private good. While for Portes (1998; 1996) it bears a 
resemblance to a club good (i.e. a congestible public good). Institutional models of 
social capital range from a generalised notion of trust to the standard theory of property 
rights. Clearly, social capital is a multifaceted concept that opens the possibility of 
rationalising policy action at a number of levels. Woolcock (2001) documents how 
social capital has been re-invented many times in many different guises. It could be 
argued without stretching the analogy too far, that some of these new ‘heads’ have 
grown in the place of other older sociological theories. 
This article provides a critical analysis of the theoretical underpinning of social capital, 
and examines the possibility of empirical measurement of the concept(s), and testing of 
the theory (or more correctly, a cluster of theories). To provide a focal point for the 
analysis, the utility of the notion of social capital will be explored in the context of 
Indigenous Australians, one of the most socially excluded groups in the first-world. 
Indigenous Australians provide an extreme test of social capital theory that allows us to 
examine the utility of the concept as a basis for constructive policy.  
The Herculean effort required to make sense of the concept of social capital is not 
without its rewards since it has provided a language for several disciplines (notably 
sociology, economics and perhaps anthropology) to interact and engage with one 
another, even though some of the extant communications may have been at cross-
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purposes.ii However, these benefits may, arguably be related to the intellectual struggle, 
rather than the notion itself or the supporting analytical structures.  
The remainder of this article is broken into five sections. First, the unique nature of 
Indigenous poverty is described and a possible role for social capital is briefly 
introduced. Second, several unresolved definitional issues that plague the concept of 
social capital are discussed. This leads to the third section that outlines several 
theoretical criticisms. Fourth, instrumental empirical issues are raised to highlight the 
difficulties in operationalising the concept. On a more positive note, the final two 
sections discuss the utility of the concept in Indigenous contexts and highlight some 
constructive avenues for future research.  
The nature of Indigenous poverty: the motivation of a possible role 
for social capital 
The existing instruments for measuring poverty have become disconnected from the life 
events that cause poverty and deprivation among Indigenous Australians. The concept 
of income poverty is inadequate with many high-income Indigenous families 
experiencing as much socioeconomic disadvantage as low income families (Hunter 
2001). Indeed, Indigenous Australians are so different from other poor (and rich) 
Australians, in terms of the nature and extent of destitution experienced, that there is a 
need for a separate model of Indigenous disadvantage (Hunter 2001). In a literal sense, 
many Indigenous people are socially excluded from mainstream Australia.  
For analytic purposes, social exclusion can be broadly defined as ‘multiple deprivations 
resulting from a lack of personal, social, political or financial opportunities’. While the 
economist’s notion of poverty is primarily focused on contemporary distributional 
issues, the notion of social exclusion focuses on inadequate social participation, lack of 
social integration, and lack of power (Room 1995). Note that social exclusion is an 
intrinsically dynamic concept, and is descriptive of a condition that develops over time 
after prolonged social isolation and deprivation. In contrast, poverty is a static concept 
defined by whether an individual, family or household have sufficient income at a 
particular point of time. 
The language of social exclusion is appealing as a description of Indigenous poverty as 
it gives the flavour of entrenched disadvantage being conditioned by historical, social, 
and cultural circumstances facing individuals. The distinguishing feature of the 
Indigenous poor is the depth of Indigenous poverty they experience across a range of 
welfare indicators. That is, poor outcomes in various spheres of life are not confined to 
those conventionally defined as poor in the Indigenous community (i.e., poor in terms of 
income). Simply increasing the financial resources available to the Indigenous ‘poor’ 
may not be sufficient to alleviate their particular form of poverty. Perhaps more 
importantly the inter-related nature of Indigenous poverty means that a direct assault on 
Indigenous disadvantage is unlikely to be successful—this interconnectedness has 
profound implications for the efficacy of the current policy of ‘practical reconciliation’ 
(Altman & Hunter 2003).  
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Any enthusiasm for social exclusion as a construct to analyse Indigenous poverty must 
be tempered by the fact that it remains a rather slippery concept that has proved 
remarkably difficult to operationalise and measure (Bradshaw 2003).  
One possibility for adding (theoretical) structure to the analysis of social exclusion is to 
examine the network of relationships, or the lack of networks, in which social exclusion 
is perpetuated. A potentially important theoretical issue in this area has been the 
development of the concept of ‘social capital’—a concept that emphasises both the 
structure and quality of social relationships.  
Despite the diversity of uses of the term, social capital can be defined as networks of 
social relations which are characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity and which lead 
to mutually beneficial outcomes (Bourdieu 1993; Coleman 1988). Thus, social capital 
can be understood as a resource for collective action, although the nature or ownership 
of the resource can be disputed. For individuals, this can mean access to social 
connections that help the processes of getting by or getting ahead. For communities, 
social capital reflects the ability of community members to participate, cooperate, and 
interact (Putnam 1995).  
Social capital arising from social networks has been classified into three types: bonding; 
bridging; and linking (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Bonding social capital is said to 
exist in dense or closed networks (e.g. among immediate family and friends). Bridging 
social capital involves overlapping networks that may make resources accessible across 
various networks. A closely related, but arguably distinct concept, is ‘linking’ social 
capital that involves social relationships with those in authority or positions of power, 
which is also useful for securing resources.  
Social capital is not unambiguously positive. Portes (1998) identifies four possible 
negative consequences: the exclusion of outsiders; excessive claims on group members; 
restrictions on freedoms of individuals; and, downward levelling of norms. For example, 
if Indigenous social networks are largely confined to the jobless, then such reductions in 
expectations can become a self-fulfilling prophesy whereby people fail to see the 
advantages in gaining further education. This, in turn, diminishes the skill acquisition 
that facilitates entry into the labour market.  
The utility of the notion of social capital lies in its flexibility and the consequent ability 
to explain negative spillovers of certain social relationships. That is, not all social 
networks are equally useful in progressing the interests of individuals or indeed, the 
group. For example, even if Indigenous job seekers have well-developed social 
networks within the Indigenous community; their contacts may be useless in securing 
work in the mainstream job markets. Indeed, social networks in Indigenous 
communities may reinforce existing poor levels of motivation, and ultimately 
individuals’ aspirations.  
While the general notion of social capital shows promise in terms of its ability to 
explain ongoing Indigenous disadvantage, the panoply of definitions and lack of 
theoretical clarity threaten to undermine its potential contributions to the policy debate.  
The Social Capital ‘Hydra’: Definitional difficulties  
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The concept of social capital is sometimes criticised as being too broad to provide a 
useful theoretical framework (Putzel 1997). The mechanisms through which social 
capital can affect a range of outcomes need to be made explicit if they are to provide a 
credible framework for analysis. For example, the benefits of social capital may be 
incidental, and not easily modelled or captured by academics or policy-makers. People 
may get jobs through networks of friendship, but they probably do not join networks 
primarily for this purpose (Arrow 2000).  
Despite some agreement from the various disciplines of the main roles and functions of 
social capital, this has not lead to a consensus about its conceptualisation (Van Deth 
2003). Van Deth claims that the bewildering number of different aspects, characteristics, 
indicators and dimensions of social capital makes a common understanding rather 
unlikely. He quotes the OECD (2001: 91) who claim that ‘much of what is relevant to 
social capital is tacit and relational, defying easy measurement or codification’. 
However, without precise definition of social capital, virtually no definitive conclusions 
or implications for operationalisation can be deduced. 
Some researchers claim that the lack of specific a priori definitions is an integral part of 
the conceptualisation of social capital. In the case of functional approaches, the exact 
form of social capital is irrelevant as long as it performs the functions (Van Deth 2003: 
81). This rationalisation is rather disingenuous (or deluded) since it is not possible to 
claim something is performing a function if one could not define or identify the 
phenomenon. Stated another way, it is not possible to interpret data without a clearly 
defined theory, so it would be impossible to identify whether or not a function was 
being fulfilled by ‘social capital’ or something else.  
One of the orthodoxies arising in the literature is that one can distinguish between the 
structural and cultural aspects of social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 1993). 
Connections or networks are seen as structural whereas the cultural aspects of social 
capital are defined in terms of the norms, manners, customs etc. related to these 
networks. While this distinction offers the prospect for refining the conceptualisation, it 
is also necessary to be clear whether social capital is the ‘property’ of individuals or is a 
collective good, by definition available to each citizen involved (Van Deth 2003). The 
public good (or public bad) aspect of social capital is likely to be particularly relevant 
for Indigenous Australians for whom reciprocal obligations are a prominent feature of 
their social relations (Hunter 2000).  
The position on whether social capital is either collective or individual in nature is 
heavily influenced by one’s disciplinary perspective. Woolcock (2001: 12), a sociologist 
with the World Bank, claims that whereas human capital resides in individuals, social 
capital resides in relationships. Much of the interest in social capital from economists 
has been fuelled by a definition that includes not only the structure of networks and 
social relations, but more individualistic behavioural dispositions and macro-
institutional measures (‘rule of law’, ‘contract enforceability’ ‘civil liberties’).  
The ‘panoply of micro and macro measures of ‘social capital’—and their corresponding 
eclectic theoretical frameworks—has led many critics to accuse social capital of being 
all things to all people (and hence nothing to anyone)’ (Woolcock 2001). One strategy 
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to address this criticism has been to refer to macro-institutional issues under a separate 
banner, calling them instead ‘social capabilities’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘social 
infrastructure’. This has the advantage of making social capital more analytically 
tractable and resolve disciplinary tensions within the social capital literature.  
Another approach has been to advocate a leaner conceptualisation of social capital that 
focuses on sources of social capital (i.e. networks), rather than on consequences such as 
trust, tolerance, and cooperation (see Woolcock 2001). Before providing a critical 
appraisal it is important to briefly outline the various streams of thought in social capital 
theory.  
Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 229) describes several conceptualisations of social 
capital: The communitarian perspective equates social capital within such local 
organisations as clubs, associations, and civic groups. However, evidence from the 
developing world demonstrates why merely having high levels of social solidarity or 
informal groups does not necessarily lead to economic prosperity (2000: 230).  
The networks view of social capital stresses the ‘importance of vertical as well as 
horizontal associations between people and of relations within and among such 
organisational entities as community groups and firms’ (Woolcock & Narayan 2000: 
230). The networks view is particularly relevant in the Indigenous context as social 
capital conceived in this way can have negative consequences with considerable claims 
on member’s sense of obligation and commitment. Indeed, group loyalties can be so 
strong that they isolate members from information about employment opportunities, 
foster a climate of ridicule towards efforts to study and work hard, or siphon off hard-
won assets (2000: 231). Woolcock and Narayan provide a diagram that illustrates how 
the relationship between social capital and poverty transitions depends on the balance of 
emphasise on bonding and bridging social capital (2000: 232). 
The institutional view of social capital emphasises the role of political, legal and 
institutional environment in determining the vitality of community networks and civil 
society (Woolcock & Narayan 2000: 234–5). In the context of Australia, notions of a 
civility are largely defined in terms of ‘white’ society. Note that even if certain macro 
aspects of social capital are syphoned off under the banners of ‘social capabilities’ etc, a 
strategy referred to in Woolcock (2001), there is still a role for institutional factors to 
explain the efficacy of social networks in achieving certain goals. One issue for the 
institutional view is that it can lack a micro foundation to its theoretical perspective. 
This is not to say that macro-aspects of social capital are not valid, rather that such 
aspects can be difficult to reconcile with the micro perspectives.  
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) advocate a synergy view that combines the institutional 
and network approaches to social capital. They dismiss the difficulties in reconciling the 
macro and micro aspects of these two largely competing views of social capital. They 
suggest that the central task for policy analysis is to show how to transform situations 
where a community’s social capital substitutes for weak, hostile, or indifferent formal 
institutions into situations in which both realms complement one another. While this is a 
laudable goal, it is easier said than done.  
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Having outlined the concepts underlying the broad streams of social capital theory, it is 
important to remember that the term is itself controversial. Many economists see the 
growing literature on social capital as an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy 
(e.g., Solow 2000: 8).iii Arrow (2000) urges the abandonment of the metaphor of capital 
and the term, ‘social capital’. To neo-classical economists, the term capital implies three 
aspects: usage over time, deliberate sacrifice of the present for future benefits, and 
alienability. The first aspect may hold in part in terms of building a reputation or a trust 
relation. But these are not like a physical investment; a little trust is almost useless.  
Social capital certainly fails to meet the second part of Arrow’s (2000) definition of 
capital. The essence of social networks is that they are built up for reasons other than 
their economic value to the participants. Indeed, this is what gives them their value in 
monitoring the group members. For example, the information from social networks 
about individual members or their actions are only credible to the extent that the group’s 
trust has not been compromised by internal competition for economic resources.  
Social capital certainly should not be called ‘capital’ if the definition demanded that it 
must be either alienable or portable (Arrow 2000). Even if you introduce someone into a 
group, it may not possible be to transfer other’s trust to this third party. However, the 
condition of portability may by too strong given that education or ‘human capital’ is not 
transferable. The presence of irreversible investments means that even physical capital 
could fail this rather restrictive definition. 
This article now reflects on the broad theoretical criticisms of the concept, before 
documenting the prospects for a valid empirical test of social capital theory.  
Theoretical Concerns about ‘Social’ Capital  
In a recent Fabian Society Pamphlet, Christopher Scanlon (2004: BB3) documents 
several criticisms of social capital that can be summarised as: 
In short, social capital is an attempt to have relations of trust, reciprocity, 
tolerance and mutual obligation without having to bother too much about the 
deeper cultural mooring points to which those relations are tied. 
While I share some of the concerns of Scanlon, he tends to overstate the case. For 
example, the use of the term social capital does not automatically make a person 
‘unwitting dupes lending legitimacy to a larger project’ of neo-liberal market-driven 
ideology (Scanlon 2004: BB4). A more prudent and accurate way of expressing a 
similar sentiment is that the poorly integrated and under-theorised nature of social 
capital literature may lend itself to disingenuous uses of the concept.  
Scanlon does however, make good use of quotes from Karl Marx to illustrate that: 
‘particular objects like land, machinery and money are under certain circumstances 
capital, but are not capital in themselves. It is only when they enter into particular social 
relations that they function as capital’ (2004: BB4). In a sense, the term social capital is 
tautological for a Marxist.  
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Therefore, one weakness of social capital theory is that it is largely formulated without 
reference to social class. In describing the structures of power, Max Weber describes the 
‘factor that creates ‘class’ is unambiguous economic interest’ (Gerth & Wright Mills 
1970). It is hard to conceive of a change in the network that does not affect economic 
interest, and hence the failure to take explicit account of class is a significant failing of 
the social capital literature. 
It is possible that if social capital is truly a public good (i.e. it is non-rivalrous and non-
excludable), as some commentators appear to think, then class interests may not be 
affected by augmentations and fluctuations in social capital for a particular group. 
However, the vehement reaction of many propertied groups in the debate on native title 
illustrate that such groups feel threatened over the perceived competition for ‘their’ (sic) 
land—class interest still exists in Australia. For Indigenous Australians at least, the 
historical exclusion from ‘elites’ and mainstream ‘power structures’ need to be 
addressed before tinkering with social networks.  
Mancur Olson (1965) suggested that elites got together to boost the prospect for 
political advantage. Note that Olson analysed the logic of collective action within a 
context of individually oriented objectives using a game theoretic framework, and hence 
is not necessarily compatible with collective interpretations of social capital or class 
analysis (e.g. Marxist).  
There is nothing that necessarily precludes social capital from being located within a 
more comprehensive view of collective action. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
synergy perspective attempts to do just that. The main problem is the extent to which 
this form of social capital theory can be tested or measured empirically. Put another 
way, since empirical analysis must hold certain things constant to be operationalised, the 
question must be asked whether a ‘multifaceted’ and ‘lightly-defined’ social capital 
theory controls for enough factors to be distinguished from competing theoretical 
perspectives.  
Discrimination is possibly a special form of social competition based on racial 
characteristics. Hunter (2004) illustrates that the scope for labour market discrimination 
against Indigenous Australians is enormous, with discrimination being more likely to 
occur in the process of securing and retaining employment rather than in the wage 
setting process. From a social capital perspective, addressing discrimination requires 
that non-Indigenous social and economic networks need to be more open to the 
Indigenous population. Arrow (1998) postulates that social segregation may give rise to 
labour market segregation if local social networks are used for job referrals. In such 
circumstances, discrimination may not have costs for the employers, and may actually 
reward discrimination if social networks are sufficiently ‘dense’. 
However, there are many competing theories of discrimination that do not necessarily 
use networks or social capital to explain the phenomenon. Employers that persist in 
discriminating could be said to be indulging a taste for discrimination (see Arrow 1998). 
Statistical discrimination—where employers who believe that one group has a lower 
average productivity than other workers use membership of the group as ‘information’ 
in hiring workers—has the potential to be more persistent if labour market segregation 
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reinforce the belief in racial differences. If the group who is discriminated against is 
relatively small, these employer’s beliefs are not challenged by the facts. 
Even if one believes that social capital, and access to social networks have certain 
characteristics usually associated with public goods (or more accurately a ‘club goods’), 
there may be indirect avenues for class interest to assert themselves. Social status is a 
relative phenomenon with classes being somewhat fluid, and is partially determined by 
current consumption.  
In The Social Limits to Growth, Fred Hirsch (1976) argued that ‘as the level of average 
consumption rises, an increasing portion of consumption takes on a social as well as an 
individual aspect’. One of the social aspects of consumption that Hirsch was concerned 
about was that of status-seeking, in which individuals use consumption as a means of 
achieving social status (i.e., the consumption of what he defined as ‘positional goods’). 
The importance of such socially constructed goods is in explaining the observation that, 
as people become richer, their levels of material frustration do not appear to diminish. 
Since the supply of positional goods is fixed in Hirsch’s analysis, policy prescription 
must be directed toward reduction of positional demand. For example, social resources 
will be wasted competing for positional goods such as homes in ‘good’ suburbs. 
Social capital theory argues that social context can be an asset for individual and groups, 
but Hirsch (1976) is concerned that social context also effects the acquisition and 
consumption of goods and services, which he asserts has lead to the modern state of 
‘commodity fetishism’.iv Many other social scientists emphasise importance of the 
social and cultural context of consumption, especially Thorstein Veblen (1902: 68–101) 
who developed the notion of conspicuous consumption. However, the importance of 
Hirsch’s contribution is in the elaboration of several mechanisms by which the 
consumption used to secure status can be socially wasteful. 
Therefore social capital misses one of the major influences of social context on 
individual and societal welfare, that competition for positional goods reduces aggregate 
wellbeing. In the language of social capital, to the extent that people are competing for 
bridging social capital, the resources involved may be wasted as the number of people 
who can have social status is limited. Hirsch’s formulation can be summarised as a zero-
sum game whereby socially wasteful competition for social status occurs through 
consumption of positional goods. While it may be possible to increase the intensity of 
involvement of high status people in social networks, one must question the extent to 
which they have incentive to do so since successful building of bridging social capital of 
the socially excluded may diminish their status.v 
Solow (2000) provides a further criticism of the utility of the term social capital. 
Contracts are almost always incomplete and the transaction costs of exchange in the 
market will be lower, defensive behaviour diminished, and economic performance better 
if the parties can expect each other to be ‘reasonable’ or non-exploitative. A reputation 
for trustworthiness in this sense can be highly valuable. While a reputation can be built 
up by repeated exhibitions of trustworthy behaviour in similar circumstances, many 
economically important situations are too anonymous or too idiosyncratic or too rare for 
reputation building to be a useful strategy. 
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Another theoretical concern is that the rather eclectic theoretical frameworks, and wide 
variety of definitions of social capital used, seems to violate Ockham’s razor—the 
scientific principle that in explaining any phenomenon, we should use no more 
explanatory concepts than are absolutely necessary. For example, the deliberate 
vagueness of some social capital theorist seems to keep options open for using several 
concepts (at different levels of analysis). While the move towards a leaner version of 
social capital may be reasonably consistent with the famous dictum, the use of multiple 
levels of analysis leads to substantial problems in our ability to measure the concepts 
underlying social capital theory.  
Measurement Problems for Social Capital  
The measurement of the validity of the various conceptualisations of social capital, and 
other potential explanations of the social data, needs to set criteria against which the 
theory can be assessed. Two or more theories are ‘observationally equivalent’ if extant 
(or even any conceivable) data collections cannot distinguish between the competing 
theories. In a sense, this is a problem for the theory being examined in that it is not 
sufficiently precise to make accurate predictions about the relationships one would 
expect to find in the data. Researchers combining limited data with different maintained 
assumptions can, and often do reach different logically valid conclusions (Manski 1995: 
3). 
A related issue is the identification problem, by which an empirical researcher seeks to 
characterise the conclusions that could be drawn if one could obtain an unlimited 
number of observations (Manski 1995). That is, certain conclusions may not be possible 
unless strong assumptions are invoked. Notwithstanding, Manski (1995) makes a plea to 
tolerate ambiguity as the credibility of social science would be higher if we strive to 
offer predictions under a range of plausible hypotheses that are consistent with the 
available evidence. Manski’s plea should not be taken as a licence for loose theorising 
because the plausible hypothesis must be clear enough that it can be validly claimed it is 
consistent with the data.  
Themes like social cohesion, engagement in networks, civic orientation, obligations, or 
norms of reciprocity have a long tradition in social sciences, long before the notion of 
social capital became fashionable in the 1990s (Van Deth 2003: 86). One important 
issue for the use of existing data sets is that they were collected and informed by 
existing (non-social capital) theories, and any attempt to re-interpret the data in terms of 
social capital may be somewhat forced. Consequently, the collection of new data 
informed by social capital theory is vitally important for testing the validity or otherwise 
of the theory.  
Karl Popper (1959) claimed that all theories must be judged ultimately in terms of their 
falsifiable predictions, a position to which many modern economists subscribe (see 
Blaug 1976: 828). One implication of the Popperian notion of falsifiability is that if a 
hypothesis cannot be falsified (e.g. creationism, religion etc.), then it doesn’t add to our 
quantum of knowledge. Given that social capital is often motivated in terms of its 
complementary relationship with human capital, it is interesting that Blaug has criticised 
the falsifiability of human capital theory and the so-called protective belt of that theory 
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(i.e. the auxiliary assumptions required to form specific testable theories). A useful 
avenue for future research is to engage in a robust debate on the extent of falsifiability 
of social capital theory. Following Popper’s reasoning, qualitative data should be 
collected in a way to maximise the possibility that the social capital hypothesis can be 
disproved with case studies being chosen as extreme examples that are more likely to be 
consistent with other theories.  
Given that social capital is a hypothesis that involves multi-level analysis (individual, 
family, community, and society), the main problem for empirical analysis is the intrinsic 
difficulty in conducting cross-level inference. The ecological fallacy (also known as the 
fallacy of composition) is that the relationships within a large group may be different 
from the theoretical and observed relationships for individuals or smaller groups. Since 
the ecological fallacy was first identified, most methodological discussions have 
focused on modifying the strict prohibition against downward cross-level inference (i.e. 
the inference from data collected for larger units to lower units of analysis)—however, 
Firebaugh (1978) shows that the fallacy is only an issue where there are causal group 
effects or externalities. Firebaugh notes that externalities are most likely to occur in 
groups where members interact and share relevant life experiences. Given that social 
capital theory often involves reference to externalities and public goods, it is an 
unavoidable issue that needs to be addressed when measuring social capital.  
The obvious answer is to collect data at several levels but ensuring that the basic data 
are collected at an individual level. However, the ABS (2000) questions whether social 
capital can be measured by aggregating information collected from individuals, 
especially if it is a property of social interactions is collective, and therefore cannot be 
held by individuals. The ABS paper goes on to question whether the ABS household 
surveys are useful means for obtaining such information, especially if social capital is 
measured at the community level. For example, the sample sizes of community (e.g. 
small area or collection district) data in household surveys are rarely large enough to 
ensure that estimates are reasonably accurate? In spite of such issues, the ABS has gone 
on to develop data collections for social capital, most notably in the General Social 
Survey and the Indigenous Social Survey (ABS 2004).  
Van Deth (2003) documents the pitfalls of using aggregate measures for collective 
phenomena. It is more difficult to develop strategies to measure social capital as a 
collective, rather an individual, phenomena. While it may be possible to develop 
collective indicators using individual level data when dealing with some aspects of 
social capital (e.g. the densities of networks), it is more difficult where simple 
aggregation is less valid. For example, do aggregate survey data about trust really 
measure the amount of trust available as a collective good for all citizens as implied by 
some social capital theorists (Van Deth 2003: 87). Either the social capital theory has to 
clearly specify the relationship between the individual and collective aspects, or an 
attempt has to be made to separately measure the collective phenomenon.  
Given the potential difficulties in aggregating individual data to estimate data for social 
groups, the higher level data might be estimated ‘directly’ using responses from a 
representative of a community organisation. While this avoids the aggregation issue, it 
is difficult to pin down what the differences between the representative response and the 
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aggregated individual responses might mean. That is, do any differences in data 
collected reflect biases in the representative’s response or inherent problems in the 
aggregation procedure used?  
One of the strengths of social capital theory is it provides an explanation for local 
contexts. However, this also implies a contextual dependency whereby it may be hard to 
develop standardised identical measures. Consequently, it is necessary to assess the 
validity of social capital indicators in different settings (cross-cultural and longitudinal) 
(Van Deth 2003: 86). This is particularly relevant for Indigenous Australians for whom 
cultural norms are clearly different from other Australians. Even within Indigenous 
Australia there are large variations in cultural practices and social contexts that need to 
be taken into account.  
Van Deth (2003: 89) also claims that the conceptual heterogeneity of social capital 
theory is not reflected in a diversity of empirical approaches, at least to the extent that 
he anticipated. He advocates the use of multi-method and multi-level strategies to 
capture the multifaceted nature of social capital. This line of argument is reminiscent of 
the empirical literature that attempts to measure social exclusion (Bradshaw 2003). 
Given the inconclusive nature of the social exclusion literature, this strategy may also be 
a risky strategy for social capital theory.  
Woolcock (2001: 12) emphasises the qualitative aspects of social capital research. At a 
minimum, the construction of survey instruments to measure social capital should 
follow intensive periods in the field, ascertaining the most appropriate way to ask the 
necessary questions. Qualitative data also needs to be collected to ascertain the relative 
importance of aggregation and other problems.  
Addressing Indigenous Disadvantage through Social Capital?  
Before uncritically importing terms like social capital, it is necessary to analyse how 
useful these concepts are cross-culturally in understanding Indigenous disadvantage. For 
example, not having any employment in the Australian labour market may actually 
empower many Indigenous peoples to hunt, fish, paint and live on their traditional land 
or ‘country’. Indeed, the extra hours of ‘spare’ time may facilitate more extensive 
participation in ceremonial activities, thus increasing what may be defined as ‘social 
capital’ (Hunter 2000). 
In addition to such cross-cultural critiques, some forms of employment may actually 
diminish the extent of shared values and trust that may exist among Indigenous groups. 
Work which involves or leads to frequent relocation of the workforce, such as some 
types of casual or seasonal work, could uproot the worker’s family and thus lessen their 
links to the local community. Clearly, the relationship between social capital and 
Indigenous unemployment is not simple. 
Bourdieu (1993: 33) sees the family as the main site of accumulation and transmission 
of social capital. However, if family ties become too strong, they may crowd out the 
weaker ties of the community. Allegiance is to family and kin and trust may not extend 
beyond the bounds of the extended family. In some cases, there appears to be something 
of an inverse relationship between the bonds of trust and reciprocity inside and outside 
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the family; when one is very strong the other tends to be very weak. Notwithstanding 
such hypotheses, in the context of Indigenous Australia the notion of family and 
community are not clearly defined and therefore empirical studies of social capital will 
have difficulties in using family data to test the theory (Morphy 2002). 
Portes (1998) defined four (sociological) sources of social capital. They are value 
introjection, bounded solidarity, reciprocity of exchanges, and enforceable trust. Each of 
these will be examined briefly with reference to the circumstances in which Indigenous 
Australians find themselves. 
Value introjection is a source of social capital that comes from shared values or cultural 
beliefs. Berndt and Berndt (1988) identify the heterogeneous nature of Indigenous 
Australia but maintain that there are commonalties across social groups. One such 
commonality that has survived colonisation is the importance of kin in everyday life 
(e.g., see Schwab 1991: 35).  
Bounded solidarity is another source of social capital springing from like people being 
in like circumstances. Finlayson (1991) describes a cycle of feast and famine in the 
Kuranda Indigenous community of North Queensland. In this welfare dependent 
community, household expenditure is linked with the welfare payment week so that 
resources are scarce in the days leading up to ‘pay day’. During this time resources are 
shared more widely, thereby lessening the adverse impact of financial deprivation. 
The third source of social capital mentioned by Portes is the reciprocity of exchanges. 
Berndt and Berndt (1988) describe the reciprocal nature of exchanges in traditional 
Indigenous society. Schwab (1995) also looks at sharing and reciprocity in Aboriginal 
families and says that sharing is based on demand, but constrained by a delicate balance 
between what it is appropriate to demand and what it is appropriate to refuse. If 
excessive or unreasonable demands are to be denied, then strategic behaviour must be 
adopted so that neither party is shamed or embarrassed.  
The final source of social capital mentioned by Portes is that of enforceable trust. This 
is the mechanism that maintains the reciprocal obligations and social norms existing 
within an Indigenous community. The ability to share is a direct expression of 
Aboriginality, with enforceable trust benefiting both the recipient (in the form of access 
to resources) and the donor (in the form of group approval). Trust exists in these 
situations because the obligation to share is enforceable through the power of the 
community. 
Portes’ review also teases out the four major negative consequences of social capital. 
They are the exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on 
the freedom of individuals, and the downward levelling of norms. 
The exclusion of outsiders may be problematic in Indigenous communities, but for 
reasons different to those described by Portes. He asserts that the exclusion of outsiders 
is a problem because it restricts benefits to those within the group. However, in the case 
of Indigenous Australians the exclusion of outsiders prevents adequate service 
provision, especially in the areas of education and health: it restricts benefits from 
reaching the group. 
  
LEARNING COMMUNITIES:  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEARNING IN SOCIAL CONTEXTS 
32 
The second possible negative effect of social capital, that of excessive claims on group 
members, is quite prevalent in Indigenous societies today. Schwab (1995) notes that 
despite the philosophy of reciprocity espoused by many Indigenous Australians, 
generosity does not flow from recognition of need, it is more often demanded. It is this 
notion of ‘demand sharing’, supported through obligatory relationships, that can lead to 
excessive claims on some group members.  
Family solidarity may impose restrictions on the freedom of individuals. Here, norm 
observance, or acting within predetermined cultural parameters, may restrict personal 
freedoms. An example of this was given in the section on reciprocity of exchanges: 
when a demand for resources is denied there are financial and social consequences. 
The final negative effect identified by Portes is what he calls a downward levelling of 
norms. Portes sites examples where a downward levelling of norms has been preceded 
by a lengthy period of restricted mobility caused by outside discrimination. Expectations 
about future life course become a self-fulfilling prophesy, limiting education and 
employment prospects. These reductions in expectations are often associated with 
socially unacceptable codes of conduct. This convergence of norms may serve to 
increase the solidarity of group members and reinforce the exclusion of outsiders. 
Downward levelling of norms can impact indirectly though the failure to see the value 
in gaining further education and in diminishing the skill acquisition that facilitates entry 
into the labour market.  
Note that the downward levelling of norms may also result from external sources with 
others expecting less from Indigenous people because they are perceived to belong to a 
dysfunctional group. Consequently, statistical discrimination may have a role in 
explaining the negative effects of social capital.  
Bounded solidarity and enforceable trust can lead in some circumstances to negative 
social outcomes and a deteriorating level of social control. The abuse of alcohol in 
Indigenous communities has vast implications for the intergenerational transfer of 
cultural norms and their impact on social control (Martin 1998). Aboriginal people 
themselves are aware of the problem and consequences of alcohol abuse—indeed, the 
concern about excessive alcohol use was raised in the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and also identified in the NATSIS. Almost three-quarters 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders reported alcohol as a substance abuse problem 
within their household (ABS 1995: 22). 
The so-called ‘dark side’ (sic) of social capital is important and needs to be understood 
(Putzel 1997). When interpreting social capital variables in the context of Indigenous 
disadvantage and prolonged unemployment, it is important to be aware how some 
indicators of social capital may act to reinforce the restrictions on individual opportunity 
and lower the aspirations of many Indigenous people.  
Social capital theory is articulated at a level abstract enough to encompass the 
experiences of many Indigenous Australians. Ironically, it is the under-theorised nature 
of social capital, rather than a lack of data, which is the major impediment to empirical 
analysis. The social capital literature, at least as described by Portes, provides a detailed 
framework for understanding the social processes, but does little to further our 
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understanding of why such processes could be described as ‘capital’. Unless more 
attention is paid to modelling exactly how these social exchanges add (or subtract) 
economic value to individuals or groups, then the term social capital is little more than a 
metaphor. People undoubtedly will try to use the social structure as a resource to further 
their interests, but the concept of social capital lacks sufficient analytical content and 
does not provide an adequate model of how this might be achieved.  
Sutherland (2003) motivates her call for a whole-of-government approach within an 
Indigenous school in the ACT in terms of both the ‘learning community’ and social 
capital literature.vi While she convincingly demonstrates the need to cultivate and 
nurture Indigenous trust in educational institutions, Sutherland’s position can also be 
justified using other theoretical perspectives, including class-based analysis.  
Notwithstanding the overall limitations of the social capital literature, social networks 
can obviously augment economic value for Indigenous Australians. Labour market 
studies point to ‘friends and relatives’ as being the most heavily utilised method of job 
search among Indigenous and other Australian youth (Gray & Hunter 2000; Heath 
1999). If the social networks of Indigenous people are confined to unemployed and 
other socially excluded individuals, then this search method is unlikely to be of much 
assistance in finding a job. Expressing this in a more positive way, if the social capital 
of Indigenous youth can be developed to extend their networks into the labour force, 
there are likely to be significant gains in Indigenous employment.  
In summary, the introduction of the term social capital may have marginally enhanced 
the debate about Indigenous disadvantage. However, unless there is a critical 
engagement with the concept, especially the ability of social capital research to 
empirically demonstrate the importance of the social and institutional context of 
Indigenous poverty, these gains will be dissipated by those who seek to justify a 
particular position in terms of disingenuous rhetoric. 
Can the Social Capital Hydra be Tamed? 
It is pertinent to remember that the Hydra in Greek mythology protected the Lernaean 
cave for the goddess Hera. Extending the metaphor at the beginning of this article 
further, the concept of social capital may also be useful in protecting the status quo in 
the modern era. For example, as most Indigenous people place a great deal of emphasis 
on kin relationships, it may be relatively easy for them to interpret social capital 
literature in their own cultural and linguistic terms. However, while some disadvantaged 
people find some resonance in the notion of social capital, they are unlikely to be talking 
about the same concept as prominent politicians, including Australia’s Prime Minister 
(John Howard), and other senior politicians (e.g. Peter Costello and Mark Latham). The 
lack of clarity in the conceptualisation of social capital Hydra is what makes it 
potentially dangerous. 
This article has attempted to argue for a more modest conceptualisation of social capital 
that is amenable to empirical analysis, and hence can be used as a basis for useful policy 
advice. A clearly formulated theory of social networks is rather like the gold hidden 
away in the Hydra’s head—it is dangerous to procure but may be ultimately worthwhile. 
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By seeking a more precise definition of social capital, I am not seeking to ignore the 
broader social and institutional context. Indeed, I believe it is important to recognise that 
power structures inform the meaning and organisation of social relationships. However, 
the point is that social capital must have theoretical content that is both distinguishable 
from other theories and empirically measurable.  
For Popper (1963), all scientific criticism must be piecemeal—that is, he holds that it is 
not possible to question every aspect of a theory at once. More precisely, while 
attempting to resolve a particular problem a scientist necessarily accepts all kinds of 
things as unproblematic. Popper develops his notion of verisimilitude to deal with 
theories which are at best approximations (1963: 235). This is often the case in the 
social sciences, and is clearly true for social capital theory. Verisimilitude describes the 
incremental movement towards theories with the greatest ‘truth-value’.  
At this early stage of development of social capital, the best strategy is to formulate 
hypotheses that are clearly falsifiable. Unfortunately, the difficulties in operationalising 
tests of multi-level hypothesis means that the more powerful tests of the theory will 
probably be conducted at either the individual or aggregate levels, but not a combination 
of both. The incremental insights gained into the processes underlying social capital 
from carefully constructed empirical tests of the theory (and hence converge towards 
‘better’ theories through the Popperian process of verisimilitude) should eventually 
allow a multi-level social capital theory to be constructed on a less ad hoc basis. This 
strategy is not without risk because this may lead to the rejection of ‘true’ hypothesis if 
there is a significant correlation between the single-level and multiple-level effects. 
However, if such correlations are second order issues, as I believe, then focussing on 
data for individuals will maximise the prospect for rejecting hypotheses without 
substantial truth-value.  
It is difficult to think of a single prediction arising from social capital theory that is 
falsifiable. For example, given that bonding social capital can have positive and 
negative consequences, to the extent that all people have such networks, it is possible 
that ‘investments’ in social networks may not yield additional economic resources. An 
even more telling point is that the more complex the account of social capital, the more 
room there is for ad hoc rationalisation of outcomes that contradict any predictions of 
the theory. The more scope there is for institutional and multi-level influences, the 
easier it is to explain apparent contradictions of the theory. While falsifiability is 
something to aspire to, it may be unreasonable to expect a wide-ranging theory such as 
social capital to embrace it. However, in such circumstances it is valid to question 
whether social capital has more in common with a religion than a scientific endeavour.  
The Productivity Commission (2003: 56) recognised that people or societies could 
‘over-invest’ in social capital because the expenditure of effort to form social capital 
precludes the expenditure of that same effort on other matters. For example, beyond 
some point, additional time spent networking may eat unduly into time spent working or 
looking for work. Social capital is obviously not a panacea, and more of it is not 
necessarily better. This observation is particularly relevant in the context of Indigenous 
Australians for whom the composition of social networks is likely to be crucially 
important. For Indigenous Australians the most productive research strategy would be to 
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focus on the role of networks in the process of social capital formation, before 
developing a more grand theory of Indigenous social capital that encompasses multiple 
levels of analysis.  
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Notes 
i. The Hydra was a monster that was reared by the goddess Hera as a menace to the Hero 
Heracles. Heracles forced the Hydra to emerge by pelting it with burning arrows, and then 
held his breath while he caught hold of it. He set alight one corner of a grove of sacred 
plane-tree in order to prevent the Hydra growing new heads (by searing their roots with 
blazing branches). Heracles then severed the immortal head with a sword, and buried it 
still hissing. He disembowelled the carcass and dipped his arrows in the gall so that the 
least wound from one of them was invariably fatal. 
ii. Hercules was the Roman equivalent of Heracles. 
iii. The appeal to authority by the use of the word ‘capital’ is ironic given a history of 
controversy of how to measure the value of physical capital (e.g., the Cambridge 
controversy of the 1960s, see Harcourt 1972). 
  
TAMING THE SOCIAL CAPITAL HYDRA? 
Boyd H. Hunter 
37 
                                                                                                                                                                               
iv. Orthodox economic analysis is concerned with the commodities people have, not with the 
way people get them. For example, the arguments of a neoclassical utility function are not 
affected by the social, cultural or historical contexts.  
v. Another issue is the physical and emotional limitation of individual to actively engage in 
social networks. This is social networks analogy of ‘bounded rationality’—the fact that most 
individuals have a limited cognitive ability, which means that they fail to live up to the ideal 
of homo economicus in neo-classical models.  
vi. Sutherland is probably overly sanguine about the positive aspects of social capital 
generated within an Indigenous schools, in that she does not explicitly acknowledge the 
possibility that excessive bonding social capital may have negative consequences (e.g. 
downward levelling of norms etc) in terms of their ability to engage with the mainstream 
economic system. Notwithstanding, her argument is driven by the fact that bonding social 
capital is crucial for building a sustainable and healthy Indigenous community.  
